To understand how irrational the United States’ flirtation with a ground war against Iran is, stop looking at Tehran. Look instead at Tel Aviv — and then at the fault lines cracking open Washington’s own political circles. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a leader whose political survival seems to depend on the conflict, has found the perfect tool: a US administration so eager to appear strong that it has forgotten what strength actually looks like.

Plainly speaking, Netanyahu’s coalition rests on ultranationalist factions, his corruption trial grinds on, and the world has not forgotten his government’s conduct in Gaza. That is where Iran comes in, conveniently positioned to drown out talk of his war crimes as charged by the International Criminal Court, while the US comes in handy as a hired gun.

The Netanyahu government has precisely read the political situation in the US. It sees the protests — such as the “No Kings” rallies — against executive overreach unfolding in Minnesota and elsewhere, and understands that a distracted Washington is a pliable one. It notes the simmering rivalry between different views on the US’ Middle East policy even within the core policymaking circle in Washington, and knows the Epstein files continue to fester awaiting full exposure. Tel Aviv’s calculation is simple: Strike Iran while the iron is hot, before the US president can no longer divert public anger with rallying calls to the flag.

The incoherent signals emerging from the White House — one moment hinting at renewed diplomatic engagement, the next moment discussing ground operations — tell you everything. Different factions, different foreign patrons, and different domestic constituencies are all vying to shape a decision that could plunge the Middle East into open war. The result is a foreign policy of spectacle.

What would a ground war mean? Oil prices are already soaring, hurting every driver in the US and every European business. The global economy would be hit with a shock that benefits only vested interests — defense contractors, certain energy players, and the political donors who move between them. The burden, as ever, would be shouldered by ordinary people.

The US administration would do well to listen to the mediators — Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkiye and others — which have been trying to de-escalate the situation. China, too, has been engaged in sustained diplomatic efforts. Foreign Minister Wang Yi has held telephone talks not only with Tehran and Tel Aviv and other capitals in the Middle East, but also with Paris, London and Ottawa. Beijing’s pro-peace actions are aimed at an outcome even the peace-lovers in the US want: an early ceasefire. When the US’ “strategic rivals”, as some in Washington call them, work harder for restraint than its allies, it means something has gone badly wrong with Washington’s strategic judgment.

Frankly, no ground invasion of Iran can end well, not for US soldiers, not for regional stability, not for the US administration’s own political standing, and certainly not for a country suffering from endless conflict and war. Iran is not Iraq. Its terrain, its population, its capacity to retaliate through proxies from Lebanon to the Gulf — these are realities no amount of military briefings can wish away.

The US administration can still step back, value mediating efforts that are already underway, and pursue talks with a sincerity the moment demands. Doing otherwise would amount to “surrender” — to an ally’s domestic agenda, to the whims of competing advisers, and to the oldest trap in Middle Eastern politics: fighting someone else’s war as if it were your own.